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Introduction to the Symposium
"Convergence on Delaware:
Corporate Bankruptcy and
Corporate Governance"
Charles M. Elson*
Robert K. Rasmussen"
Bankruptcy is back. The use of Chapter 11 by large, publicly
held firms was a subject of much debate in the academic and popular
press in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Firms such as Texaco,
Revco, LTV, Federated Department Stores, Maxwell Communications,
TWA, and Eastern Airlines all filed for bankruptcy during that time.
The economic boom of the mid- and late 1990s, however, resulted in a
relative dearth of high-profile bankruptcy cases. The recent economic
downturn has moved corporate reorganizations back into the spotlight. The Chapter 11 filings by firms such as Enron, Global Crossing,
the Loewen Group, US Airways, United Airlines, and WorldCom have
focused attention once again on Chapter 11. Yet today's bankruptcy
practice has changed notably since our last wave of major bankruptcies.
The most visible change in the reorganization of large, publicly
held companies in the past fifteen years has been the rise of the Delaware bankruptcy court. As of 1990, a firm looking to reorganize under
Chapter 11 would most likely file its bankruptcy petition in the
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Southern District of New York. Today, such firms look first and foremost to Delaware, Indeed, other courts are changing their practices to
mirror those of Delaware. This switch in the lead venue of reorganization practice raises two sets of questions. The first set of questions focuses directly on this trend. Delaware's prominence in corporate law
has spawned a decades-old debate over why firms choose Delaware
and whether the forces that drive firms to Delaware create a body of
corporate law that advances or impedes societal interests. The rise of
the Delaware bankruptcy court raises similar inquiries. In short, we
need to explore why firms now choose to file for reorganization in
Delaware, and whether the switch to Delaware is one that should be
applauded or condemned.
The stampede to Delaware raises a second set of questions as
well. Delaware now seems to be the home of both corporate law and
corporate bankruptcy law. This overlap fuels speculation about the
appropriate relationship between bankruptcy law and corporate governance. The questions that implicate both corporate law and bankruptcy law include whether primary regulation should come from the
federal government or from the states, whether law should be mandatory or not, and what the appropriate allocation of decisionmaking authority is for the future of the firm.
The Vanderbilt University Law and Business Program, the
Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware, and
the Vanderbilt Law Review organized this Symposium, "Convergence
on Delaware: Corporate Bankruptcy and Corporate Governance," to
address these issues. The Symposium, held at the Vanderbilt University Law School on February 22 and 23, 2002, brought together leading bankruptcy academics and practitioners to discuss the various issues raised by the convergence on Delaware.
Three articles in this Symposium issue directly address the rise
of Delaware as the bankruptcy forum of choice. Marcus Cole's contribution recounts the story of Delaware's rise to prominence. Drawing
on interviews with practitioners and bankruptcy judges, Cole explains
the factors that affect how the managers of a firm select the venue in
which to file. Based on these interviews, he concludes that there is a
subset of bankruptcy judges who are in competition with each other
for high-profile cases. He notes that there are potential gains from
such competition and considers two reforms of extant law that could
engender even more competition.
Lynn LoPucki and Joseph Doherty attempt to assess the efficacy of the Delaware and Southern District of New York bankruptcy
courts. Earlier work by LoPucki and Sara Kalin suggested that firms
that file in Delaware and the Southern District of New York and sub-
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sequently emerge from bankruptcy tend to file a second reorganization
more often than firms that file for reorganization in other courts.
LoPucki and Doherty confirm and extend those results here. They reject many of the benign explanations offered for the difference in refiling rates and conclude that the difference can be attributed to lax
practices by these two courts.
Harvey Miller, one of the nation's leading bankruptcy attorneys, takes issue with these conclusions. He argues that Delaware offers significant advantages as a venue for the reorganization of large,
complex firms. To the extent that firms that file for bankruptcy and
reorganize tend to file for bankruptcy again, this choice stems in large
part from dynamics over which the court has no control.
The remaining articles in the Symposium issue address the increasing convergence of bankruptcy law and corporate law. One of us
(Elson) shows how ideas developed from corporate governance literature can improve bankruptcy law. Modern corporate scholarship and
practice is concerned with structuring a company's board of directors
so as to align their interests with maximizing firm value. Elson offers
a case study of the bankruptcy reorganization of the Loewen Group to
show how these interests can be translated to the bankruptcy forum.
Alon Chaver and Jesse Fried also borrow from the corporate
governance literature to suggest ways to improve bankruptcy law.
They focus on the fiduciary duties of directors, long a staple of corporate law. They argue that managers' fiduciary duties should extend to
creditors who are owed performance, as opposed to cash, by the debtor.
This expanded notion of fiduciary duties would lead the firm to make
decisions that increase overall social welfare.
John Armour, Brian Cheffins, and David Skeel extend this
thinking about the relationship of corporate law and bankruptcy law
to the English context. Professor Skeel, in prior work, has argued that
corporate law and bankruptcy law work in tandem. England presents
a challenge to this thesis. In response to the pattern of corporate reorganization practiced in England, Armour, Cheffins, and Skeel argue
that the role of debt in both corporate governance and the resolution of
financial distress needs to receive more attention than it has in the
past.
Barry Adler's contribution challenges us to think even more
broadly about bankruptcy law. Adler calls into question the practice of
viewing corporate reorganization law solely as a subset of corporate
law. Rather, Adler argues that bankruptcy law is best viewed as part
and parcel of each area of law that it touches. Contracts, torts, and
property, just to name a few areas, cannot be fully grasped without a
proper understanding of how bankruptcy law interacts with these ar-
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eas. In all areas of private law, parties can plan their actions in the
light of how their legal entitlements will be affected down the road by
a bankruptcy petition. It is these strategic issues, and not a concern
with a collective-action problem, that Adler argues should be front and
center when focusing on bankruptcy policy.
Douglas Baird and one of us (Rasmussen) explore the recent
bankruptcy of Enron to demonstrate how bankruptcy practice has
changed. Bankruptcy law historically has been premised on the notion of preserving going-concern value through negotiations among the
various creditors and shareholders. Such negotiations never took place
in the Enron case. As is increasingly the case in large Chapter 11s,
Enron's assets were sold quickly, leaving the asset-deployment decision in the hands of the new owners. The bankruptcy court is left with
the task of sorting out complex and perhaps conflicting legal claims to
the funds generated by the sale of the assets. This development suggests that we should no longer think of Chapter 11 as a collective forum in which the interested parties gather to bargain over the fate of
the firm.
We hope that the readers of this Symposium issue will learn as
much from the articles here as we did.

